Anti-Terror Strategy, the 9/11 Commission Report & Terrorism Financing: Implications for U.S. Policymakers; Strategic Insights, v. 6, issue 1 (January 2005) by Perl, Raphael
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2005-01-01
Anti-Terror Strategy, the 9/11
Commission Report & Terrorism
Financing: Implications for U.S.
Policymakers; Strategic Insights, v. 6,
issue 1 (January 2005)
Perl, Raphael
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School






Anti-Terror Strategy, the 9/11 Commission Report & Terrorism 
Financing: Implications for U.S. Policymakers 
Strategic Insights, Volume IV, Issue 1 (January 2005) 
by Raphael Perl 
Strategic Insights is a monthly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary 
Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are 
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of 
Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
For a PDF version of this article, click here. 
  
Throughout the course of history, few, if any, wars against groups using terrorist-type tactics have 
been won by defensive operations. Accordingly, United States anti-terrorism strategy relies 
heavily on the doctrine of preemption. As a subset of this framework of preemption, U.S. anti-
terrorism strategy targets the financing of terrorism. In the 9/11 Commission report’s 
recommendations are two overarching issues which relate to the financing of terror:  
1. what strategy—or strategy mix—best addresses the issue of terrorist financing, and  
2. to what degree are the goals and objectives sought by such a strategy realistically 
achievable, cost effective, and in tandem with other counter- terrorism and foreign and 
domestic policy objectives.  
Central to the policy debate is deciding on and prioritizing strategic goals. Once goals are in place 
and prioritized, a framework can be designed to measure the effectiveness of efforts designed to 
address terror finance.  
This paper provides an overview of United States anti-terrorism strategy and the overall role of 
terror financing within the framework of current policy. It then looks at the 9/11 Commission 
Report’s approach to terror finance strategy and identifies issues and challenges facing 
decisionmakers.  
U.S. Anti Terror Strategy 
The framework for U.S. anti- terrorism strategy is governed by the National Strategy for 
Combating Terrorism, a 30-page interagency document released by the White House on 
February 14, 2003.[1] The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is designed to complement 
other elements of the National Security Strategy[2] including sub-strategies for homeland security, 
weapons of mass destruction, cyberspace, critical infrastructure protection, and drug control. 
While the National Strategy for Homeland Security[3] focuses on preventing terrorist attacks 
within the United States, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism focuses on identifying 
and defusing threats before they reach U.S. borders. Incorporated in the National Strategy for 
Combating Terrorism is a strong preemptive component, a strong focus on reducing proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction, and a defense-in-depth framework.[4]  
The intent of the strategy is to stop terrorist attacks against the United States, its citizens, its 
interests, and U.S. friends and allies around the world, as well as to create an international 
environment inhospitable to terrorists and their supporters. The strategy emphasizes that all 
instruments of U.S. power—diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, financial, information 
dissemination, intelligence, and military—are to be called upon in combating international 
terrorism. The strategy fits into the wider strategic concept of “defense-in-depth,” which projects 
four concentric rings of defense against terrorist attacks against the United States.[5]  
The Bush Administration’s 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is founded on four 
pillars—defeating, denying, diminishing, and defending.  
· Together with U.S. allies, defeating terrorists by attacking their sanctuaries; leadership; 
command, control, and communications; material support; and finances. Components 
include: (1) identifying and locating terrorists by making optimal use of all intelligence 
sources, foreign and U.S., and (2) destroying terrorists and their organizations by capture 
and detention and prosecution, use of special forces and other military power, and 
employment of specialized intelligence resources, and international cooperation to curb 
terrorist funding;  
· Denying terrorists state sponsorship, support, and sanctuary/safehavens. A central 
strategy objective is to ensure that other sovereign states take action against such 
elements within their sovereign territory and areas which they may control in neighboring 
countries. Elements include: (1) tailoring strategies to induce individual state sponsors of 
terrorism to change policies; (2) promoting international standards for combating 
terrorism; (3) eliminating sanctuaries; and (4) interdicting terrorist ground, air, maritime, 
and cyber traffic, in order to deny terrorists access to arms, financing, information, WMD 
materials, sensitive technology, recruits, and funding from illicit drug activities;  
· Diminishing underlying conditions that terrorists exploit, by fostering economic, social, 
and political development, market-based economies, good governance, and the rule of 
law.  Emphasis includes: (1) partnering with the international community to alleviate 
conditions leading to failed states that breed terrorism; and (2) using public information 
initiatives to de-legitimize terrorism; and  
· Defending U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad to include protection of 
physical and cyber infrastructures.  
Attacking terrorist financing is a core objective clearly stated as part of the strategy’s first pillar: 
“attacking”. Denying terrorists access to financing is a core objective of the second strategy pillar: 
“denying”. Central to the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is law enforcement 
cooperation and an increasingly important component of law enforcement cooperation involves 
curbing terrorist financing.[6]  
In summary, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism places a moderate to strong priority 
on combating terrorist financing which it views primarily within the context of a law enforcement 
framework centering on international cooperation.  
Under the strategy, the raison d’etre for a policy focus on the financing of terror is to deny funding 
to terrorist groups to disrupt and destabilize their operations by causing them to expend added 
effort to secure funding at the expense of other operational activity. Although the strategy does 
not specifically address the use of covert activity as a means of disrupting terrorist financing, 
arguably such activity is contemplated as part of the overall preemptive network-destabilizing 
approach it advocates.  
The 9/11 Commission Report 
On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States [“9/11 
Commission”] issued its final report.[7] Included are forty-one recommendations for changing the 
way the government is organized to combat terrorism and how it prioritizes its efforts. Many of the 
Commission’s recommendations are consistent with elements of the Administration’s February 14, 
2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism[8] such as diplomacy and counter-proliferation 
efforts, preemption, intelligence and information fusion, winning hearts and minds—including not 
only public diplomacy, but also policies that encourage development and more open societies, 
law enforcement cooperation, combating terrorist financing, and defending the homeland.[9]  
The 9/11 Commission’s recommendations generally fall into the categories of (1) preemption 
[attacking terrorists, and preventing the growth of Islamic terrorism by methods that include 
targeting financial facilitators and funds,]; (2) protecting against and preparing for attacks; (3) 
coordination and unity of operational planning, intelligence and sharing of information; (4) 
enhancing, through centralization, congressional effectiveness of intelligence and counter-
terrorism oversight, authorization, and appropriations; (5) centralizing congressional oversight 
and review of homeland security activities; and (6) increasing FBI, DOD, and DHS capacity to 
assess terrorist threats and their concomitant response strategies and capabilities. The report 
specifically recommends confronting openly problems in the U.S.- Saudi relationship, read by 
some to include such issues as terrorist financing and the billions of dollars of support for 
fundamentalist madrasa schools[10] that are often breeding grounds for Islamist fundamentalists 
susceptible to terrorist recruiters, as well as the issue of ideological incitement. The report also 
recommends sustaining aid to Pakistan and Afghanistan, which are perceived to be vital geo-
strategic allies in the global war on terror.[11]  
The issue of terror financing is addressed both in the 9/11 Commission Report and in an in-depth 
supplemental report on terror financing released by the Commission on August 24, 2004.[12] In 
its report, the Commission specifically recommended that:  
“Vigorous efforts to track terrorist financing must remain front and center in U.S. counter terrorism 
efforts. The government has recognized that information about terrorist money helps us to 
understand their networks, search them out, and disrupt their operations. Intelligence and law 
enforcement have targeted the relatively small number of financial facilitators–individuals al 
Qaeda relied on for their ability to raise and deliver money–at the core of al Qaeda’s revenue 
stream. These efforts have worked. The death or capture of several important facilitators has 
decreased the amount of money available to al Qaeda and has increased its costs and difficulty 
in raising and moving the money. Captures have additionally provided a windfall of intelligence 
that can be used to continue the cycle of disruption.”  
—Final Report of the National Commission of Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, p.382  
In the text of the Report, the Commission suggests that an important purpose of targeting terror 
financing is to gather information on terror networks and coalitions and to raise the costs of 
raising money (in terms of financial expenditures and organizational energy) to al Qaeda and 
other groups. Moreover, the Report suggests that if al Qaeda is replaced by smaller decentralized 
groups, the assumption that terrorists need a financial support network may become outdated.[13]  
The Commission’s conclusions are further supported in its August 24, 2004 in-depth 
supplemental staff report on terror financing which emphasized that the U.S. Government has 
made little leeway in deciphering al Qaeda funding channels and which cited the organization’s 
ability to adapt quickly and effectively to financial obstacles posed by government activity.[14]  
In effect, the Commission suggests a redefining of terrorist financing strategy goals away from a 
focus on seizing assets and towards a focus on gathering intelligence.[15] Three factors are cited 
which likely contributed to the desire for such a shift in policy focus. First, there is the realization 
that it may not be achievable or cost effective to deny terrorists funding in any meaningful sense; 
i.e. “that trying to starve the terrorists of money is like trying to catch one kind of fish by draining 
the ocean.”[16] Second, it is acknowledged that terrorists increasingly seek more informal 
methods of moving and obtaining funds making it more difficult for authorities to seize amounts of 
significance. Third, a concern is expressed that as terrorist networks become increasingly 
decentralized, they may become financially self supporting making it even harder to track or 
interdict their funding.[17] Similar conclusions were previously reached by many in the policy 
community in the course of the war on drugs concerning interdiction efforts aimed at the finances 
of the drug trade.  
One potential shortcoming with the Commission’s reasoning, however, is that although dollar 
amounts seized may be small and statistically insignificant, such funding may be critical to the 
execution of terrorist operations and thus the ultimate impact of such seizures on thwarting 
imminent terrorist activity may be high. Clearly situations exist where a specific funding 
transaction, albeit it low in dollar amount, may be key to success of a terror equation. Another 
prickly problem not dealt with in the report and arguably beyond the primary scope of the 
Committee’s mandate, is the issue of centralization/and or coordination of United States federal 
efforts designed to track terrorist financing.[18] Likewise, the issue of coordinating with the United 
Nations Counter Terrorism Committee under the rubric of U. N. Security Council Resolution 1373 
to make maximum use of relatively scarce manpower resources is not addressed in the 
Commission Report.[19]  
The Report does not address two additional benefits of targeting financing, i.e., that such 
measures (1) may prove useful as a coalition building tool, and (2) may have a chilling effect on 
donations to terrorist groups, thereby negatively reducing the potential of terrorist groups to 
recruit from otherwise unknown sympathizers or “sideline/ fringe” supporters. Also not addressed 
in the report is the need to help train other countries to improve their laws, regulations, and 
manpower resources to enable them to curb terrorism fund-raising and transfer of funds.  
Issues for U.S. Decisionmakers  
Despite its overt praise for United States efforts aimed at combating terror finance which have 
resulted in intelligence windfalls, closing of charities, and arrest of key financiers, the underlying 
message sent by the Commission report about the focus and effectiveness of anti-terror financing 
strategy amounts to nothing less than a policy bombshell. Implied in the report is the notion that 
previous policy mindsets which placed strong emphasis on seizing terrorist assets hold little or no 
promise of success in combating financing of Islamist terrorism. This in turn raises the question—
in what areas if any, are chances for success promising? What strategy—or strategy mix—is 
appropriate to address the issue terrorist financing; how much policy focus should terror financing 
be given; what should the rational for policy focus be; and finally, how does one get the most 
“bang” for the buck?  
At least four issues are central to the policy debate emerging in the wake of the 9/11 Commission 
Report. They include:  
· On what assumptions should policy be based?  
· What should the goals and objectives of policy be?  
· How does one measure success or failure of policy implementation?  
· What specific policy options may hold promise of success?  
Policy Assumptions  
In the past, a core assumption underlying United States anti-terror financing policy was that 
significantly decreasing financing of terrorist causes was achievable, and that decreasing funding 
will decrease terrorist activity. Th e 9/11 Commission Report by its comparison of attempts to dry 
up terrorism finance to “draining the ocean” challenges the assumption that financing of terror can 
be reduced on a grand scale.[20] A likely result here is a shift away from a policy focus on seizing 
money to a more multifaceted approach within which viewing money trails as source of 
intelligence is central.  
While recognizing that the goals of seizing assets and tracking them are not mutually exclusive, 
the 9/11 Commission report emphasizes that the United States must expect “less from trying to 
dry up terrorist money and more from following the money for intelligence, as a tool to hunt 
terrorists, understand their networks, and disrupt their operations.”[21] In the words of 
Commission Chairman Thomas Kean, “...we have been spending a lot of energy in the 
government trying to dry up sources of funding. ...Obviously if you can dry up money, you dry it 
up, but we believe one thing we didn’t do effectively is follow the money. That’s what we have to 
do.”[22]  
Further challenging the assumption that significant amounts of terrorist funding can be seized and 
that such seizure will have a negative impact on terrorist activity is the suggestion in the Report 
that given the increasingly decentralized structure of terrorist groups, the assumption that 
terrorists need a financial support network may become outdated.[23] A related question is the 
degree to which the United States and the international community have the infrastructure in 
place to effectively detect and monitor transactions associated with terrorist activity.  
Establishing Goals and Objectives  
Setting goals is central to policy formulation and implementation. In a past era of state sponsored 
terrorism where denying terrorist groups funding support was seen as realistically achievable, the 
goal of terrorism finance policies centered on drying-up financial support from state actors, and 
where this failed, on seizing and interdicting assets. Moreover, many investigators migrated to the 
financial tracking component of counter-terrorism community from the counter-drug community, 
where attempting to seize assets was a high profile, widely accepted, and entrenched practice. 
This further reinforced a mindset focused on interdicting funds.[24]  
The 9/11 Commission Report opens the door to a more holistic approach to terrorist financing 
where financing is seen within the broader policy objectives of a strategy which goes beyond 
seizing assets. Under such an approach, money is viewed as a facilitator—one of many tools at 
the terrorist’s disposal. Under such an approach, seizing sums of money becomes a priority not 
because the amount is large, but because of the intended use for the funding and/or its criticality 
to an imminent attack. Since current anti-terror policy places high value on denying terrorists 
access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), a core objective of post 9/11 policy is to deny 
terrorist groups critical mass funding that could be used for WMD purchases.  
A number of goals are commonly cited when discussions of terrorism financing policy take place. 
They include: (1) seizing assets or denying them to terrorists especially in instances where the 
funding in question can make or break a terrorist operation.; (2) gaining strategic and tactical 
intelligence on terrorist groups and activities; (3) international coalition building;[25] (4) reducing 
international crime;[26] (5) reassuring the public that the government is attacking terrorism; (6) 
deterring individuals or charitable organizations from financing terrorist causes;[27] (7) disrupting 
terrorist organizations and forcing terrorists to devote more time to logistical support and less to 
operations; and; (8) creating additional legal tools by which to arrests terrorists before deadly 
operations materialize.  
Measuring Success  
Indicators of success or failure of policies serve as an important tool to better enable 
decisionmakers to fund policies that work and revise or abandon those that do not. A challenge 
bedeviling policymakers is how to measure the success, or failure, of policies which respond to 
the challenges posed by the financing of terror. Indicators of success cannot be measured in a 
vacuum. They must be measured in the context of policy goals and objectives.  
Moreover, since terrorists and those charged with combating terrorism may have differing goals 
and objectives, definitions of success may differ for each group. For example, success for those 
charged with securing an airport may be claimed by citing the absence of attacks on the facility 
and the hi-profile presence of security personnel and detection technology. In the same example, 
success for the terrorist network may equally be claimed because the enemy has expended 
unnecessary resources protecting a facility that was never targeted for attack, with the aggregate 
result of such expenditures being less available resources to devote to other counter-terror goals 
such as combating terrorist financing. One potential pitfall plaguing measurement of success is 
overreliance on quantitative data at the expense of its qualitative significance.  
Candidates for a multi-dimensional metric to qualitatively analyze the degree of success of a 
strategy designed to address the financing of terror are many. Practical application of such 
metrics poses no small challenge. Criteria potentially include: (1) assets and money seized; (2) 
loss of desire of people to contribute money to terrorist causes; (3) money not given, i.e. the 
chilling effect of policies on contributions;[28] (4) changes in levels of terrorist recruitment; (5) the 
number of terrorist operatives apprehended or killed; (6) the public relations impact on a society 
of government policies that target terrorist financing[29]; (7) the disruptive effect of policies on 
terrorist activities and organizational infrastructures, including deterring or slowing down potential 
attacks; (8) the impact of policies on coalition building, and (9) the impact of policies in curbing 
other criminal activity—especially activity linked to terrorist groups—such as the illicit drug and 
arms trade and piracy of intellectual property.  
Finally, there remains the intelligence value of policies employed. Clearly here, an important 
metric is the impact of intelligence gained on directly preventing catastrophic terrorist events.  
Policy Options  
Increasingly, analysts compare terrorist financing to a hydra, where if one cuts off one hand, two 
more appear, leaving policy implementors always behind the power curve. To counter this 
phenomenon, some suggest that a viable strategy should focus not only on money, but on the 
demand driving the money. Within such an expanded policy framework, funding for terror is 
viewed as a product of an ideology which must be countered.  
Inherent in such a policy framework, is the assumption that as long as there is a desire for people 
to contribute to radical Islamist causes, they will find a way to do so. Under this line of reasoning, 
the struggle over terrorism finance boils down to a struggle of ideology, and an increasing number 
of analysts suggest that until nations recognize and come to terms with this, they will not 
substantially impact terrorist financing and will not win the war on terror.  
Complementing the effectiveness of United States policies designed to combat terror financing is 
a perception that anti-terror finance policies are contrary or hostile to a central tenet of Islam 
which requires financial contribution to Islamic causes. In this vein, some suggest that a major 
challenge to terrorist financing policy is a need to facilitate channeling of charitable donations to 
non-jihadist causes. United States policy seeks to identify organizations and charities which are 
terrorist connected or terrorist fronts. In contrast, donors need to be able to identify legitimate 
charities without terrorist connections.[30]  
A range of policy options exists for decisionmakers to weigh when seeking to devise more 
effective strategies to deal with the phenomenon of terrorist financing. Nine notable examples are:  
1. Rethinking assumptions and expanding policy to include a demand/supply framework 
with a component aimed at reducing the pool of potential contributors to terrorist causes. 
Included is working with those who offer alternatives to radical Islam and those who seek 
to discredit the ideology of radical Islamists.  
2. Adopting a mindset which increasingly views money as a tool and a facilitator of 
terrorism—as a source of information to be studied—and not merely as a product to be 
seized.  
3. Placing more emphasis on international coalition building where much of the focus is on 
diplomacy and building the coalition, rather than seizing assets or monitoring financial 
flows. Once built and solid, a coalition of this nature can be expanded into other areas of 
mutual interest and concern. This approach would require additional emphasis on 
diplomacy and would likely require additional funding for diplomacy as well as additional 
funding for training of U.S. and foreign specialists in detecting and countering terrorist 
fundraising and money transfers.  
4. Initiating a concerted effort —starting from scratch and mindful of the protection of civil 
liberties—to determine what data is currently available on terrorist financial flows, how to 
obtain more of it, and how to apply state of the art technology to correlate the data with 
the objective of identifying sinister patterns of activity.  
5. Concentrating on high value targets: significant money, suspicious transactions, key 
financiers, charities and front groups.  
6. Giving the issue of state financing of terror an invigorated priority, as arguably this 
remains a major problem. To what degree is the current policy focus on al Qaeda type 
networks drawing attention away from the reported role of states such as Saudi Arabia, 
Iran, and Syria in financing, facilitating, or countenancing the financing of terror? What 
actions to engage, or sanctions to prod, can the United States and the international 
community better bring to bear on so-called “rogue” nations?  
7. Developing and implementing more proactive policies. For example, how might one 
maximize worldwide the legal right of contributors to demand an accounting of how 
charitable contributions are used? How might the funding of militant madrasas throughout 
the world be better discouraged? How will a terrorist organization respond to the shutting 
down of a particular source of funding, and how does one stay ahead of the curve? 
Included here are sting operations and use of covert actions against terrorist financial 
centers, businesses, and individuals engaged in facilitating terrorism through funding.  
8. Devoting more policy focus to combat criminal activities such as piracy of intellectual 
property rights, narcotics and human trafficking, counterfeiting, etc., which are being used 
as sources of funding by terrorists.[31]  
9. Committing adequate funding to implement policy. In the past there have been numerous 
charges of insufficient funding to combat terrorism finance.[32]  
Conclusion 
Arguably, in the global war on terror, the man with the money is as dangerous as the man with 
the gun. Despite the difficulties of interdicting terrorist financing, policies which ignore or 
downplay the importance of money to terrorist operations appear unwise, since successful 
interdiction of funds can derail terrorist operations. Moreover, detecting and tracking illicit 
transactions can yield valuable intelligence which may be unavailable from other sources. Since 
Islam and other world religions require charitable contributions from adherents, implying 
unstoppable cash flows, it is imperative that donations be channeled away from terrorist causes 
towards legitimate charities.  
As the 9/11 Commission Report suggests, in the financial war on terror, success should not only 
be measured quantitatively in terms of dollars seized, but should also be measured against more 
subjective criteria, such as making financial transfers more labor-intensive for terrorists, thereby 
cutting into their time for actual operations.  
It is important to recognize that fighting terrorism is often a matter of quietly making gains a yard 
or two at a time, not necessarily spectacular interceptions of specific operations. Given the 
increasing financial and technological sophistication of our adversaries and the panoply of funds 
transfer methods, from money laundering to hawala, one should expect to interdict only a modest 
percentage of terrorist financing, and arguably should refrain from overcommitting effort in areas 
with diminishing returns. Important here is recognition of the limits of policies designed to restrict 
financing of terrorism; although seizing funds can impact on the ability of terrorist organizations to 
recruit and conduct operations, such seizures will do little to deter individual suicidal fanatics. 
However, seizing funds intended as compensation to relatives of suicide bombers may indeed 
have a chilling effect on terrorist recruitment.  
Pre-emptive action has been shown to be extremely effective from a public relations standpoint. 
When the finances of illicit charities are attacked worldwide, other charities and even 
uncooperative governments often take positive steps to avoid further "loss of face." It is vitally 
important for policy formulators to understand in depth the social and cultural values of other 
countries, which may be very different from our own, in order to maximize the positive impact of 
our anti-terror and anti-terror finance strategies worldwide.  
Educational systems imbued with hatred and bigotry, whether parochial or secular, fuel an 
unending supply of future contributors to terrorist causes. This issue must be addressed head on; 
otherwise the seeds of terrorism are sown in the next generation. Thus, many argue that a policy 
priority must be to reduce the fomenting of terrorism brought about by extreme bias, hyperbole, 
lies, and calls to violence in educational materials.  
In concrete terms this means addressing head on the serious problem of militant Islamist 
madrasas; helping host countries channel funds towards madrasas which teach mainstream 
“peace-based” interpretations of Islam. Benign religious schools form an intrinsic and valuable 
educational element of many societies, including our own, and funding for Islamic schools with 
positive social curricula should be encouraged. Moreover, efforts to reduce the funding of 
madrasas would likely encounter resistance and lead to conflict, although monitoring the sources 
of funds could be helpful in ensuring that donations do not come with “strings attached” to teach 
militancy and violence.  
Increasingly analysts urge that within the financial arena as well as in other aspects of terrorism, 
a balance must be struck between vigorous prosecution of anti-terrorism policies and the 
protection of civil liberties, which some contend have already been eroded to a dangerous extent 
in pursuit of homeland security. Admittedly, enhancing security requires an increased degree of 
government intervention. But clearly, the avowed intent of United States policymakers is not to 
defend freedom abroad while compromising it at home.  
Formulation of policy in the complex constellation of trade-offs associated with counter-terrorism 
in general, and combating terrorist financing in particular, would likely be facilitated through 
constructive involvement of academicians and scholars, religious and community leaders, 
diplomats, military commanders, politicians, and others. An interdisciplinary task force which 
merges government expertise with that of the private sector and the scientific and academic 
community might well make important contributions to understanding the multi-faceted nature of 
the problem of financing of terrorism. Discussions could also include the best way to work with 
the United Nations and willing partner countries.  
The 9/11 Commission Report has created an environment which facilitates open and creative 
discussion about the goals and objectives of terror finance policy and the best way to implement 
them. Many suggest, therefore, that the time is ripe for the Executive Branch to sit down with 
experts and re-evaluate where the effort against terrorism financing has been going, where it 
should be going, and how to best define and achieve success.  
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